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The Role of Expectations in a Macroeconomic
Model with Inventories




In this paper we use a non-tâtonnement dynamic macroeconomic model
with overlapping generations of consumers to study the role of expectations
and inventories in the business cycle. Prices are ﬁxed at the beginning of
each period but adjusted between periods, taking into account possible
market imbalances that have occurred within the period in an equilibrium
with stochastic rationing. Producers hold inventories if they do not suc-
ceed to sell all their supply in the current period. Consumers too may
store the consumption good so as to transfer it to the second period of
their life. Whether they do this depends on their price expectations: only
if they expect the price to rise will they desire to buy the planned con-
sumption for both periods in the ﬁrst period. Therefore price expectations
a r ed e c i s i v ef o rt h et y p eo fd y n a m i c st h a tc o m e sf o r t h .I np a r t i c u l a rt h e r e
are multiple equilibria in the sense that, for otherwise the same parame-
ters but with diﬀerent types of expectations, there are sequences of inﬂa-
tionary as well as deﬂationary equilibria with self-conﬁrming expectations.
In addition, and consistent with expectations, there may be endogenous
expectations-switching along a trajectory. The above framework is applied
to policy evaluations regarding the eﬀectiveness of measures to overcome
a quasi-stationary state of deﬂationary recession with underemployment,
as is currently occurring in Japan. Such a state may have been provoked
by a restrictive monetary shock and exasperated by over-investment and
inventory holding, the latter by amplifying the spill-over eﬀect from the
goods to the labour market. If the recession is not to deep, creating in-
ﬂationary expectations succeeds in exiting from the recession. Otherwise
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1there may be a temporary eﬀect of reducing unemployment but then the
economy falls back into recession. Thus in that case other policy measures
have to be taken, too. Among these, and contrary to conventional wis-
dom, balanced-budget cuts in taxes and government spending combined
with downward rigidity of nominal wages seem to be the most eﬀective
ones.
JEL classiﬁcation: D45, D50, E32, E37
Keywords: expectations, inventories, non-neutrality of money, deﬂa-
tion.
1 Introduction
2T h e M o d e l
We consider an economy in which there are n OLG-consumers, n0 ﬁrms and
a government. Consumers oﬀer labor inelastically when young and consume a
composite consumption good in both periods. They may buy this good in any
period or in their ﬁrst period of life only and transfer a part of it to the second
period. The good is produced by ﬁrms using an atemporal production function
whose only input is labor. Firms too may transfer unsold units of the consumption
good into the future. The government levies a proportional tax on ﬁrms’ proﬁts
to ﬁnance its expenditure for goods. Nevertheless, budget deﬁcits and surpluses
may arise and are made possible through money creation or destruction.
2.1 Timing of the Model
In period t−1 producers obtain an aggregate proﬁto fΠt−1 which is distributed at
the beginning of period t in part as tax to the government (taxΠt−1) and in part
to young consumers ((1 − tax)Πt−1), where 0 ≤ tax ≤ 1.A l s oa tt h eb e g i n n i n g
of period t old consumers may hold a total quantity of money Mt, consisting of
savings generated in period t−1. Thus households may use money as a means of
transfer of purchasing power between periods. Whether they do this depends on
their price expectations for their second period of life: since consumers may store
consumption good bought in the ﬁrst period, they will voluntarily hold money
only if they expect the good’s price to decrease. They may be forced, however,
to do this in case they are rationed in their consumption goods purchases in the
ﬁrst period. Total money holdings in the economy at the end of period t −1 are
Mt + Πt−1.
Let Xt denote the aggregate quantity of the good purchased by young con-
sumers in period t, pt its price, wt the nominal wage and Lt the aggregate quantity
of labor. Then
Mt+1 =( 1− tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptXt.
2Denoting with G the quantity of goods purchased by the government and taking
into account that old households want to consume all their money holdings in
period t, the aggregate consumption of young and old households and of the
government is Yt = Xt + Mt
pt + G. Using that Πt = ptYt − wtLt, considering
Πt − Πt−1 = ∆MP
t as the variation in the money stock held by producers before
they distribute proﬁts and denoting with ∆MC
t = Mt+1 − Mt the one referring
to consumers, we obtain ∆MC
t + ∆MP
t = ptG − taxΠt−1 = budget deﬁcit.
Denoting with St the aggregate amount of inventories carried over by ﬁrms to
period t and with Y
p
t the aggregate amount of goods produced in period t,t h e r e
results St+1 = Y
p
t + St − Yt.
2.2 The Consumption Sector
In his ﬁrst period of life each consumer born at t is endowed with labor  s and
an amount of money (1 − tax)Πt−1/n while his preferences are described by the
utility function u(xt,x t+1)=xh
tx
1−h
t+1,0 <h<1, where x denotes consumption.1
In solving his decision problem the young household has to decide whether to
buy the quantities xt and xt+1 in periods t and t +1 , respectively, or buy the
total quantity xt + xt+1 in period t and transfer xt+1 to period t +1 .T h i s i n
turn depends on the value of θ
e
t ≡ pe
t+1/pt where the superscript e stands for
expectation. If θ
e
t < 1, then the consumer expects a decrease in the goods price
and hence prefers to buy xt+1 in his second period of life. In the opposite case
θ
e
t > 1 he buys everything in his ﬁrst period.
We ﬁrst treat the case θ
e
t < 1. Then the consumer works with the budget
constraints
0 ≤ xt ≤ ω
i


























denote the consumer’s real wealth when he is unemployed and employed, respec-
tively. Implicit in this formulation is that rationing on the labor market is of the
all-or-nothing type and that the labor market is visited before the goods market.
On the goods market the young household succeeds to buy its quantity de-
manded xd
t with probability γd
t and is rationed to zero with probability 1 − γd
t,
where γd
t ∈ [0,1] is a rationing coeﬃcient that the household perceives as given
but that will be determined in equilibrium. Hence, the expected value of xt is
γd
txd
t, meaning that rationing is proportional and thus manipulable.
Eﬀective demand xdi







1−h . The solution is xdi
t = hωi
t.T h u s t h e y o u n g c o n s u m e r ’ s
eﬀective demand is independent of γd
t and θ
e
t b u ti td o e sd e p e n do nt h er e a l
income ωi
t and hence on whether the consumer has been employed.
1See Colombo and Weinrich (2003b) for a more general approach to the consumer’s problem.
3Consider now the case θ
e
t > 1. Then the consumer wants to buy the total
quantity xt +xt+1 ≡ b xt in his ﬁrst period of life and thus has to meet the budget
constraint
xt + xt+1 ≤ ω
i
t ,i =0 ,1 .
Monotonicity of the utility function implies that his eﬀective demand is b xdi
t = ωi
t.
The aggregate supply of labor is Ls = n s. Denoting with Ld
t the aggregate
demand of labor and with λ
s






the fraction of young consumers that
will be employed, the aggregate demand of goods by young consumers in case of
deﬂationary expectations θ
e







































whereas in case of inﬂationary expectations θ
e



































F r o m( 1 )a n d( 2 )i ti se v i d e n tt h a tt h eo n l yd i ﬀerence in the aggregate eﬀective
demand by young consumers implied by diﬀerent expectations θ
e
t < or > 1 lies
in the multiplicative factor τ ∈ {h,1}. W es h a l lt h e r e f o r ei d e n t i f yt h ev a l u eo f




The total eﬀective aggregate demand of the consumption sector is now ob-







t;αt,(1 − tax)πt,τ)+mt + G
where αt ≡ wt/pt and πt ≡ Πt−1/pt.
2.3 The Production Sector
Each of the n0 identical ﬁrms uses an atemporal production function y
p
t = f ( t)=
a b
t,a,b>0. Having transferred stocks from the previous period and being thus
endowed with inventories st at the beginning of period t, the total amount sup-
plied by a ﬁrm is ys
t = y
p
t +st.A sw i t hc o n s u m e r s ,ﬁrms too may be rationed, by
means of a rationing mechanism analogous to that assumed for the consumption
sector.
Denoting the single ﬁrm’s eﬀective demand of labor by  d
t, the quantity of labor
eﬀectively transacted is  d
t with probability λ
d





t ∈ [0,1]. It is obvious that E t = λ
d
t d
t. On the goods market the rationing rule




t, with prob. σγs
t
dtys
t, with prob. 1 − σγs
t
,
where σ ∈ (0,1),γs
t ∈ [0,1] and dt =( γs
t − σγs
t)/(1 − σγs
t).σis a ﬁxed parame-
ter of the mechanism whereas λ
d
t and γs
t are perceived rationing coeﬃcients taken
as given by the ﬁrm the eﬀective value of which will be determined in equilibrium.
The deﬁnition of dt implies that Eyt = γs
tys
t which, in particular, is independent




The ﬁrm’s eﬀective demand  d
t =  d (γs

































+ st. The upper bound on labor demand
reﬂects the fact that the ﬁrm must be prepared to ﬁnance labor service purchases
even if rationed on the goods market (since the labor market is visited ﬁrst, it
will know whether it is rationed on the goods market only after it has hired
labor). In general the solution depends on this constraint but it is not binding















Notice that labor demand is independent of st. The aggregate labor demand then
is Ld
t = n0 d (γs
t;αt) ≡ Ld (γs
t;αt) and, because only a fraction λ
d
t of ﬁrms can hire






















3 Temporary Equilibrium Allocations
For any given period t we can now describe a feasible allocation as a temporary
equilibrium with rationing as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a real wage αt, ar e a lp r o ﬁt level πt, real money balances mt,
inventories St,al e v e lo fp u b l i ce x p e n d i t u r eG, at a xr a t etax and an expectation
















constitute a temporary equilibrium if the following
conditions are fulﬁlled:
















t;αt,(1 − tax)πt,τ)+δtmt + εtG;
















t (1 − δt)=0 ;δt (1 − εt)=0 .
5Conditions (C1) and (C2) require that expected aggregate transactions bal-







t. Equations (C3) formalize the short-side rule according to which
at most one side on each market is rationed. The meaning of the coeﬃcients δt
and εt in (C2) and (C4) is that also old households and/or the government can be
rationed. However, according to condition (C4) this may occur only after young
households have been rationed (to zero).
As shown in the table below it is possible to distinguish diﬀerent types of
equilibrium according to which market sides are rationed: excess supply on both
markets is called Keynesian Unemployment [K], excess demand on both markets
Repressed Inﬂation [I], excess supply on the labor market and excess demand on
the goods market Classical Unemployment [C] and excess demand on the labor
market with excess supply on the goods market Underconsumption [U].
K I C U
λ
s
t < 1 =1 < 1 =1
λ
d
t =1 < 1 =1 < 1
γs
t < 1 =1 =1 < 1
γd
t =1 < 1 < 1 =1
δt =1 ≤ 1 ≤ 1 =1
εt =1 ≤ 1 ≤ 1 =1
Of course there are further intermediate cases which, however, can be consid-
ered as limiting cases of the above ones. In particular, when all the rationing
coeﬃcients are equal to one, we are in a Walrasian Equilibrium.2
Existence and uniqueness of temporary equilibrium are established by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 For any quadruple of variables (αt,m t,πt,S t), with αt strictly
positive and mt,πt and St non-negative, any non-negative pair of policy parame-





. Lt is given by
Lt =m i n
n




≡ L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ)
(5)

























2For an illustration of equilibrium regimes and their representation in the p − w plane, see
Colombo and Weinrich (2003b).
6Y t ≡ Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ) is determined as follows. If Lt = e L(·),t h e nY t =
αt






St,a n di fLt = Ld (1,α t),t h e nY t = αt
b Ld (1,α t)+St. Finally,
if Lt = Ls,t h e nY t =m i n
©
αt
b Ls + St,τ(1 − tax)πt + ταtLs + mt + G
ª
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
For the sake of illustration let us consider a situation of Keynesian Unem-
ployment. This type of equilibrium involves rationing of households on the labor




















(where we have suppressed all arguments that are not rationing coeﬃcients).
The consumption sector supplies the amount of labor Ls > Lt and demands
the quantity of goods Y d
t = Y t whereas ﬁrms demand labor Ld
t = Lt and supply
Y s
t > Y t of goods. It follows that λ
s
t = Lt/Ls,γs





(= δt = εt), which are just the values that led households and ﬁrms to express
their respective transaction oﬀers. Thus their expectations regarding these ra-
tioning coeﬃcients are conﬁrmed. Nevertheless, due to the randomness in ra-
tioning at an individual agent’s level, eﬀective aggregate demands and supplies
of rationed agents exceed their actual transactions. Moreover, as indicated ear-
lier, these excesses can be used to get an indicator of the strength of rationing.
Since there is zero-one rationing on the labor market, 1−λ
s
t =( Ls−Lt)/Ls is the
ratio of the number of unemployed workers and the total number of young house-

























t > 0. S oad e c r e a s ei nY t (for example due
to a reduction in government spending), and thus an aggravation of the shortage
of aggregate demand for ﬁrms’ goods, is unambiguously related to an increase in
1−γs
t which can therefore be interpreted as a measure of the strength of rationing
on the goods market. A similar reasoning justiﬁes the use as rationing measures
of the terms 1 − λ
d
t and 1 − γd
t in the other equilibrium regimes.
4D y n a m i c s
So far our analysis has been essentially static. For any (αt,πt,m t,S t), (G,tax)
and τ we have described a feasible allocation in terms of a temporary equilibrium
with rationing. To extend now our analysis to a dynamic one we must link
successive periods one to another. This link will be given by the adjustment
7of prices, by the changes in the stock of money and in proﬁts and by possible
changes in the expectation type. The latter is a somewhat subtle issue which we
will treat as the last point in our description of the dynamics. For the moment
we assume a given expectation type τ ∈ {h,1} and proceed as if this type were
constant. Later we will introduce the possibility of expectation switching.
For given τ, the dynamics in proﬁts, money and inventories follow from the
deﬁnition of these variables and equations (5) to (7), i.e.
Πt = ptY t − wtLt,
Mt+1 =( 1 − tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptY t + δtMt + εtptG











Y t = Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ) and Lt = L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ).
As for the adjustment of prices and wages we assume that, whenever an excess
of demand (supply) is observed, the price rises (falls). In terms of the rationing
coeﬃcients observed in period t, this amounts to
pt+1 <p t ⇔ γ
s
t < 1; pt+1 >p t ⇔ γ
d
t < 1,
wt+1 <w t ⇔ λ
s
t < 1; wt+1 >w t ⇔ λ
d
t < 1.




[1 − µ1 (1 − γs
t)]pt if γs
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∈ C ∪ I
. (11)
The dynamics of the model in real terms is then given by the sequence
{(αt,m t,πt,S t)}
∞
t=1,w h e r eαt+1 is as in (10),
πt+1 =


















+ St − Y t.









. This will be done in Appendix 3 where we will also give the
corresponding explicit equations of the complete dynamic system.
We introduce now the possibility of expectation switching. We would like
this to occur whenever it is required in order to keep expectations correct along
a trajectory of the system. For example, consider the case that, in period t,
consumers have deﬂationary expectations (θ
e
t ≤ 1 or, equivalently, τ = h) but
the equilibrium in period t is such that there is excess demand on the goods
market and thus pt+1 >p t. Then the assumption τ = h in period t has been
incorrect and we substitute it by τ =1 ,i . e .θ
e
t > 1. Of course then a diﬀerent
equilibrium arises in period t b u tw ec l a i mt h a tt h et y p eo fe q u i l i b r i u mi ss t i l ls u c h
that there is excess demand on the goods market. Therefore expectations have
been adjusted so as to become correct. Analogously we correct the expectations
in case θ
e
t > 1 but the equilibrium in period t involves excess supply on the goods
market. The rationale for doing this is given by the following
Lemma 2 Assume that for τ = h in period t an equilibrium with γd
t < 1 occurs.
Then this inequality is preserved when switching in period t to τ =1 . Conversely,
assume that for τ =1in period t an equilibrium with γs
t < 1 occurs. Then this
inequality is preserved when switching in period t to τ = h.
Proof: Assume τ = h in period t and in the corresponding equilibrium
we have γd
t < 1. Then there is excess demand on the goods market, Y d
t =
Xd
t + mt + G>Ys
t . If τ is changed to τ =1 , then by (1) and (2) Xd
t increases.
Thus the excess of demand over supply on the goods market can only increase
and in particular Y d
t >Ys
t still holds.
9Conversely, consider τ =1in period t and γs
t < 1.T h e n Y d
t <Y s
t and
changing τ from 1 to h decreases Xd
t ,t h u sY d
t ,a n dY d
t <Ys
t is preserved. ¥
Taking into account expectations switching a trajectory of the dynamic system




6 Policy and the Japanese Deﬂationary Reces-
sion
7C o n c l u s i o n s
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13Appendix 1: Lemma A.1
Lemma A.1 When b ≤ 1 − σ, the solution to the ﬁrm’s maximization problem is












Proof. The ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution of the ﬁrm’s problem is
γsf0 ( )=α ⇔ γsbf ( )
 
= α ⇔   = γsbf ( )
α
.




1−σ yield 1 ≤ 1−σ
b(1−γsσ). From this follows
  ≤






















which proves our claim. ¥
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
Since we hold {αt,m t,πt,S t }, (G,tax) and τ ﬁxed, we omit these variables when-












and its subsets H
K = H |γd=1,λs<1, H
I = H |γd<1,λs=1, H
C = H |γd<1,λs<1 and H
U
= H |γd=1,λs=1 . Using the terminology introduced by Honkapohja and Ito (1985), we




K + {(0,m t + G)} =
n³
λsLs,Xd (λs)+mt + G
´







Ls,γdXd (1) + mt + G
´
| γd ∈ (0,1)
o
∪ {(Ls,δm t + G) | δ ∈ (0,1]}











∈ [0,1) × (0,1)
o





U + {(0,m t + G)} =
n³

















we deﬁne the production sector’s trade curves as F
K = F |λd=1,γs<1, F
I = F |λd<1,γs=1,
F
C = F |λd=1,γs=1and F

























whereas from f ( )=a b follows f0 ( )=b
f( )
  , which implies f ( )=1















































Ld (γs;αt),γsY s (1,γs;αt,S t)
´








































t;αt) is strictly increasing in γs



























| λd ∈ [0,1)
o
.













| 0 ≤ L<L d (1;αt)
o
.











































= γs ≤ 1, F
K is positioned below F
I.
Finally consider F



























I,i ti sc l e a rt h a tF
U is the set of points contained between
F
K and F
I. Figure A.1 illustrates the producers’ trade curves.
Using the consumption sector’s and the production sector’s trade curves and in-
















































To show existence of an equilibrium is equivalent to showing that Z is not empty.

















t)=τ [(1 − tax)πt + αtλs
tLs].
Deﬁning the function







is the part of the graph of Γt for which L ≤ Ls.

















for which L ≤ Ld(1). Notice that the graphs of the functions Γt and ∆t always intersect.
Indeed, Γ0
t (L)=ταt and Γt (0) = τ (1 − tax)πt + mt + G>0, whereas ∆0
t (L) ≥ αt
b >
ταt (since 1/b > 1 ≥ τ)a n d∆t (0) = 0. Setting ∆t (L)=Γt (L) yields (6) with the
unique solution denoted e L(αt,πt,m t,G,tax,τ). Therefore the equilibrium level on the
labor market is
Lt =m i n
n
e L(αt,πt,m t,G,tax,τ),L d (1,α t),L s
o
= L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ)
whereas the one on the goods market is, by deﬁnition of the function Y (·),
Y t = Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ).




=( L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ),Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ))
exists and is uniquely deﬁned. ¥
Appendix 3: The explicit complete dynamic system
The dynamic system is given by four diﬀerent subsystems, one for each of the
equilibrium types K, I, C and U, and endogenous regime switching. For given (G,tax)





being of one of the above types (or of an intermediate one). More
precisely, equation (5) allows us to characterize the type of equilibrium deﬁned in
Table 1: if Lt = e L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ), the resulting equilibrium is of type K
or a limiting case of it. If Lt = Ld (1,α t),t y p eC or a limiting case of it occurs.
Finally, if Lt = Ls, an equilibrium of type I or a limiting case results if αt
b Ls + St
≤ τ (1 − tax)πt + ταtLs + mt + G; otherwise the equilibrium is of type U.R e g i m e








of type T0 6= T.
The above discussion and Proposition 1 allow us to determine the expressions of
those rationing coeﬃcients which are possibly smaller than one. This is summarized in
the following corollary of Proposition 1.









.I n c a s eC, λs
t = Lt
Ls
and, in case I, λd
t = Ls
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if Y t <G








t = Lt/Ld (γs
t;αt).
















































tSt = Y t
Recalling that λdLd (γs;αt)=Lt and solving for γs
t yields the claimed expression.
In all cases, the values of λs
t and λd
t are immediate by deﬁnition. The value of γs
t in
case K can be obtained using equation (3). Finally, γd
t,δ t,ε t are determined by means
of Deﬁnition 1 and equations (1) and (2). ¥
We can now give the explicit equations of all subsystems of the dynamical system.
Keynesian unemployment system
Employment level: Lt = e L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ).
Output level: Y t = αt


















t =1 ,δ t = εt =1 .
Price inﬂation: θt =1− µ1 (1 − γs
t).





Real proﬁt: πt+1 = 1
θt
¡
Y t − αtLt
¢
.
Real money stock: mt+1 = 1
θt [mt + G +( 1− tax)πt] − πt+1.






1−b + St − Y t.
Repressed inﬂation system
Lt = Ls.
Y t = αt
b Lt + St.
λs




If Y t ≥ G + mt, then γd
t = Y t−mt−G
τ(1−tax)πt+ταtLt,δ t = εt =1 ;
if G + mt > Y t ≥ G, then γd
t =0 ,δ t = Y t−G
mt ,ε t =1 ;
if Y t <G ,then γd


































1−b + St − Y t.
Classical Unemployment System
Lt = Ld (1,α t).
Y t = αt




t =1 ,γ s
t =1 ;
if Y t ≥ G + mt, then γd
t = Y t−mt−G
τ(1−tax)πt+ταtLt,δ t = εt =1 ;
if G + mt > Y t ≥ G, then γd
t =0 ,δ t = Y t−G
mt ,ε t =1 ;
if Y t <G ,then γd

































1−b + St − Y t.
Underconsumption
Lt = Ls.
Y t = τ (1 − tax)πt + ταtLs + mt + G.
λs


















t =1 ,δ t = εt =1 .






















1−b + St − Y t.
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